

Efficient and Privacy-Preserving Compressive Learning

 Ph.D. Defense

Author: Antoine Chatalic

Supervisor: Rémi Gribonval

Jury members: Francis Bach (reviewer)
Lorenzo Rosasco (reviewer)
Jamal Atif
Mike Davies
Magalie Fromont Renoir
Marc Tommasi

Université de Rennes 1, IRISA/Inria, Panama research group

November 19th, 2020

Efficient and Privacy-Preserving Compressive Learning

Efficient and Privacy-Preserving Compressive Learning

- 1 An Introduction to Large-Scale Learning
- 2 The Compressive Learning Framework
- 3 Privacy-Preserving Compressive Learning
 - A formalism to measure privacy
 - A private variant of the sketching mechanism
 - The utility-privacy tradeoff
 - A subsampling mechanism
- 4 Efficient Sketching using Structured Matrices
 - Construction of structured operators
 - Benefits of fast transforms
 - Some theoretical elements
- 5 Conclusion: Summary and Perspectives

An introduction to machine learning

Example: email classification for phishing detection.

An introduction to machine learning

Example: email classification for phishing detection.

From: trusted.colleague@irisa.fr
Subject: [panama] Next working group
Content: Dear Panama, the reading group is coming back! [...]

✓ OK

From: inegon06@netscape.com
Subject: Avoid Suspension!!
Content: Dear subscriber, Your Microsoft account has been compromised. You must update it immediately or your account will be closed. [...]

✗ Phishing

An introduction to machine learning

Example: email classification for phishing detection.

From: trusted.colleague@irisa.fr
Subject: [panama] Next working group
Content: Dear Panama, the reading group is coming back! [...]

✓ OK

From: inegon06@netscape.com
Subject: Avoid Suspension!!
Content: Dear subscriber, Your Microsoft account has been compromised. You must update it immediately or your account will be closed. [...]

✗ Phishing



An introduction to machine learning


Example: email classification for phishing detection.

From: trusted.colleague@irisa.fr
Subject: [panama] Next working group
Content: Dear Panama, the reading group is coming back! [...]

✓ OK

From: inegon06@netscape.com
Subject: Avoid Suspension!!
Content: Dear subscriber, Your Microsoft account has been compromised. You must update it immediately or your account will be closed. [...]

✗ Phishing



An introduction to machine learning


Example: email classification for phishing detection.

From: trusted.colleague@irisa.fr
Subject: [panama] Next working group
Content: Dear Panama, the reading group is coming back! [...]

✓ OK

From: inegon06@netscape.com
Subject: Avoid Suspension!!
Content: Dear subscriber, Your Microsoft account has been compromised. You must update it immediately or your account will be closed. [...]

✗ Phishing



An introduction to machine learning


Example: email classification for phishing detection.

From: trusted.colleague@irisa.fr
Subject: [panama] Next working group
Content: Dear Panama, the reading group is coming back! [...]

✓ OK

From: inegon06@netscape.com
Subject: Avoid Suspension!!
Content: Dear subscriber, Your Microsoft account has been compromised. You must update it immediately or your account will be closed. [...]

✗ Phishing




This is a **supervised binary classification problem**.

General idea: fit a **mathematical model** using the measured data.

Different types of learning tasks

Binary classification

(supervised learning)




Model: smooth separator.

Applications: phishing detection,
image classification...

Different types of learning tasks

Binary classification

(**supervised** learning)




Model: smooth separator.

Applications: phishing detection,
image classification...

Clustering


(**unsupervised** learning)



Different types of learning tasks

Binary classification

(supervised learning)




Model: smooth separator.

Applications: phishing detection, image classification...

Clustering

(unsupervised learning)




Model: set of k points.

Applications: community detection, anomaly detection...

Different types of learning tasks


Binary classification (supervised learning)



Model: smooth separator.

Applications: phishing detection, image classification...


Clustering (unsupervised learning)



Model: set of k points.


Applications: community detection, anomaly detection...

Principal component analysis (PCA) (unsupervised learning)



Different types of learning tasks


Binary classification (supervised learning)



Model: smooth separator.

Applications: phishing detection, image classification...


Clustering (unsupervised learning)



Model: set of k points.

Applications: community detection, anomaly detection...

Principal component analysis (PCA) (unsupervised learning)




Model: k -dimensional linear subspace.

Applications: compression, data visualization...

Different types of learning tasks


Binary classification (supervised learning)



Model: smooth separator.

Applications: phishing detection, image classification...


Clustering (unsupervised learning)



Model: set of k points.

Applications: community detection, anomaly detection...

Principal component analysis (PCA) (unsupervised learning)



Model: k -dimensional linear subspace.

Applications: compression, data visualization...

Goal: find the parameters θ of our model \mathcal{M}_θ which best “fit” the data:


$$h^* = \arg \min_{\theta \in \Theta} \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{M}_\theta, \text{data}).$$

Set of parameters defining a low dimension model

Risk function measuring how a model “fits” the data

Different types of learning tasks


Binary classification (supervised learning)



Model: smooth separator.

Applications: phishing detection, image classification...


Clustering (unsupervised learning)



Model: set of k points.

Applications: community detection, anomaly detection...

Principal component analysis (PCA) (unsupervised learning)



Model: k -dimensional linear subspace.

Applications: compression, data visualization...


Goal: find the parameters θ of our model \mathcal{M}_θ which best “fit” the data:

$$h^* = \arg \min_{\theta \in \Theta} \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{M}_\theta, \text{data}).$$

Set of parameters defining a low dimension model


Risk function measuring how a model “fits” the data

Main challenges



Challenges:


Main challenges



Challenges:

- \leftrightarrow Large data collections.
- \updownarrow High-dimensional features.


Main challenges



Challenges:

- ↔ Large data collections.
- ↕ High-dimensional features.
- ☰ Distributed datasets.
- ⋯ Data streams.


Main challenges



Challenges:

- ↔ Large data collections.
- ↑ High-dimensional features.
- ☰ Distributed datasets.
- ⋯ Data streams.
- 👁 Sensitive data
(e.g. emails, medical data).

Main challenges




Challenges:

- \leftrightarrow Large data collections.
- \updownarrow High-dimensional features.
- \equiv Distributed datasets.
- \dots Data streams.
- 👁 Sensitive data
(e.g. emails, medical data).

Limitations of “standard” methods:

- 🔄 Multiple passes on the data.
- 🕒 Computationally expensive.
- 🔌 High energy consumption.

Main challenges



Challenges:

- \leftrightarrow Large data collections.
- \updownarrow High-dimensional features.
- \equiv Distributed datasets.
- \dots Data streams.
- 👁 Sensitive data
(e.g. emails, medical data).


Limitations of “standard” methods:

- 🔄 Multiple passes on the data.
- 🕒 Computationally expensive.
- 🔌 High energy consumption.

Can we do better?


Existing approaches for large-scale learning

💡 Reduce/compress the data!



Existing approaches for large-scale learning


💡 Reduce/compress the data!



- ▷ **Dimensionality Reduction**
Data-dependent or independent.

Existing approaches for large-scale learning


💡 Reduce/compress the data!



- ▷ **Dimensionality Reduction**
Data-dependent or independent.
- ▷ **Coresets**
Subsampling, geometric decompositions.

Existing approaches for large-scale learning

💡 Reduce/compress the data!




▷ **Dimensionality Reduction**
Data-dependent or independent.

▷ **Coresets**
Subsampling, geometric decompositions.

▷ **Sketching**
Sketches of moments, "linear" sketches.

Existing approaches for large-scale learning

💡 Reduce/compress the data!




▷ **Dimensionality Reduction**
Data-dependent or independent.

▷ **Coresets**
Subsampling, geometric decompositions.


▷ **Sketching**
Sketches of moments, "linear" sketches.

The Compressive Learning Framework

Compressive learning




Compressive learning




The sketch is just a vector of “generalized” moments!


Benefits of sketching




Benefits of sketching




Benefits of sketching




Benefits of sketching




Benefits of sketching



Benefits of sketching




Which feature map Φ can we use?



We consider $\Phi(\mathbf{x}) \triangleq \rho(\mathbf{\Omega}^T \mathbf{x})$ where

- $\mathbf{\Omega} = [\boldsymbol{\omega}_1, \dots, \boldsymbol{\omega}_m] \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times m}$ is a **random** matrix (e.g., i.i.d. normal entries);
- ρ is a **deterministic non-linear** function applied pointwise.

Which feature map Φ can we use?



We consider $\Phi(\mathbf{x}) \triangleq \rho(\Omega^T \mathbf{x})$ where

- $\Omega = [\omega_1, \dots, \omega_m] \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times m}$ is a **random** matrix (e.g., i.i.d. normal entries);
- ρ is a **deterministic non-linear** function applied pointwise.

Examples:

- For k-means: $\rho(t) \triangleq \exp(-t)$ (**random Fourier features**)
[Rahimi and Recht, 2008. “**Random Features for Large-Scale Kernel Machines**”]
(Sketch = random samples of the empirical **characteristic function**.)

Which feature map Φ can we use?




We consider $\Phi(\mathbf{x}) \triangleq \rho(\Omega^T \mathbf{x})$ where

- $\Omega = [\omega_1, \dots, \omega_m] \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times m}$ is a **random matrix** (e.g., i.i.d. normal entries);
- ρ is a **deterministic non-linear** function applied pointwise.


Examples:

- For k-means: $\rho(t) \triangleq \exp(-t)$ (**random Fourier features**)
[Rahimi and Recht, 2008. “**Random Features for Large-Scale Kernel Machines**”]
(Sketch = random samples of the empirical **characteristic function**.)
- For PCA: $\rho(t) \triangleq t^2$ (**random quadratic features**)
(Sketch = rank-one linear measurements of the covariance matrix for centered data.)


Learning as an inverse problem



Learning as an inverse problem



Learning as an inverse problem




Moment-matching problem:

$$\arg \min_{p \in \mathcal{G}} \left\| \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(p)}_{\text{sketch of } p} - \underbrace{\tilde{\mathbf{s}}}_{\text{empirical sketch}} \right\|_2$$

Cf. generalized method of moments [Hall, 2005].

Learning as an inverse problem




Moment-matching problem:

$$\arg \min_{p \in \mathcal{G}} \left\| \underbrace{\mathcal{A}(p)}_{\text{sketch of } p} - \underbrace{\tilde{\mathbf{s}}}_{\text{empirical sketch}} \right\|_2$$


Cf. generalized method of moments [Hall, 2005].

⚠ Difficult/non-convex problem!
 Heuristics can be used, e.g. “continuous” matching pursuit.
 [Keriven et al., 2017]


Contributions



Contributions




Contributions




Privacy-Preserving Compressive Learning

(Work in collaboration with V. Schellekens, F. Houssiau, L. Jacques and Y.-A. de Montjoye)


Privacy preservation: what are we talking about?




Privacy preservation: what are we talking about?



Privacy preservation: what are we talking about?



Privacy preservation: what are we talking about?



Defining and quantifying privacy

[Dwork et al., 2006. “Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis”]

Definition: The randomized mechanism $\mathbf{z}(\cdot)$ achieves (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy (DP) iff for any (input) neighbor datasets $\mathbf{X}_1 \sim \mathbf{X}_2$ and set S :

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{z}(\mathbf{X}_1) \in S] \leq \exp(\epsilon) \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{z}(\mathbf{X}_2) \in S] + \delta$$

Defining and quantifying privacy

[Dwork et al., 2006. “Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis”]

Definition: The randomized mechanism $\mathbf{z}(\cdot)$ achieves (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy (DP) iff for any (input) neighbor datasets $\mathbf{X}_1 \sim \mathbf{X}_2$ and set S :

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{z}(\mathbf{X}_1) \in S] \leq \exp(\epsilon) \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{z}(\mathbf{X}_2) \in S] + \delta$$

Examples of neighboring relations:

- replacement of one element:



- add/removal of one element:



$$\mathbf{X}_1 \quad \mathbf{X}_2 = \mathbf{X}_1 + \text{👤}$$

Defining and quantifying privacy

[Dwork et al., 2006. “Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis”]

Definition: The randomized mechanism $\mathbf{z}(\cdot)$ achieves (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy (DP) iff for any (input) neighbor datasets $\mathbf{X}_1 \sim \mathbf{X}_2$ and set S :

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{z}(\mathbf{X}_1) \in S] \leq \exp(\epsilon) \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{z}(\mathbf{X}_2) \in S] + \delta$$

Examples of neighboring relations:

- replacement of one element:



- add/removal of one element:



\mathbf{X}_1

$\mathbf{X}_2 = \mathbf{X}_1 +$



Defining and quantifying privacy

[Dwork et al., 2006. "Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis"]

Definition: The randomized mechanism $\mathbf{z}(\cdot)$ achieves (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy (DP) iff for any (input) neighbor datasets $\mathbf{X}_1 \sim \mathbf{X}_2$ and set S :

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{z}(\mathbf{X}_1) \in S] \leq \exp(\epsilon) \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{z}(\mathbf{X}_2) \in S] + \delta$$

\rightarrow relaxation ("approximate DP" when $\delta > 0$)

\rightarrow privacy "budget" (smaller ϵ = more privacy)

Examples of neighboring relations:

- replacement of one element:



- add/removal of one element:



\mathbf{X}_1

$\mathbf{X}_2 = \mathbf{X}_1 +$



Defining and quantifying privacy

[Dwork et al., 2006. "Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis"]

Definition: The randomized mechanism $\mathbf{z}(\cdot)$ achieves (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy (DP) iff for any (input) neighbor datasets $\mathbf{X}_1 \sim \mathbf{X}_2$ and set S :

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathbf{z}(\mathbf{X}_1) \in S] \leq \exp(\epsilon) \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{z}(\mathbf{X}_2) \in S] + \delta$$

→ relaxation ("approximate DP" when $\delta > 0$)

→ privacy "budget" (smaller ϵ = more privacy)

Examples of neighboring relations:

- replacement of one element:



- add/removal of one element:



\mathbf{X}_1


$\mathbf{X}_2 = \mathbf{X}_1 +$



Notation:

- (ϵ, δ) -DP in general;
- ϵ -DP when $\delta = 0$.


Interpretation of ϵ -DP



Differential privacy by additive perturbation

Simple way to satisfy DP: add noise to the output.


Proposed mechanism



X


Differential privacy by additive perturbation

Simple way to satisfy DP: add noise to the output.



Differential privacy by additive perturbation


Simple way to satisfy DP: add noise to the output.



- Add noise ξ on the sum of features.

Differential privacy by additive perturbation


Simple way to satisfy DP: add noise to the output.



- Add noise ξ on the sum of features.
- Add noise ζ on $|\mathbf{X}|$.

Which noise to ensure privacy? (Common knowledge)


- Laplacian noise for pure ϵ -DP.



[Dwork et al., 2006. “Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis”]

Which noise to ensure privacy? (Common knowledge)


- Laplacian noise for pure ϵ -DP.



[Dwork et al., 2006. “Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis”]

Which noise to ensure privacy? (Common knowledge)


- Laplacian noise for pure ϵ -DP.



[Dwork et al., 2006. "Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis"]

Which noise to ensure privacy? (Common knowledge)

- Laplacian noise for pure ϵ -DP.




Noise level: $b^* = \frac{\Delta_1(f)}{\epsilon}$ with $\Delta_1(f) \triangleq \sup_{\mathbf{X}_1 \sim \mathbf{X}_2} \|f(\mathbf{X}_1) - f(\mathbf{X}_2)\|_1$.

[Dwork et al., 2006. "Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis"]

Which noise to ensure privacy? (Common knowledge)

- Laplacian noise for pure ϵ -DP.



Noise level: $b^* = \frac{\Delta_1(f)}{\epsilon}$ with $\Delta_1(f) \triangleq \sup_{\mathbf{X}_1 \sim \mathbf{X}_2} \|f(\mathbf{X}_1) - f(\mathbf{X}_2)\|_1$.

[Dwork et al., 2006. “Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis”]


- Gaussian noise for approximate (ϵ, δ) -DP.

The noise scales with $\Delta_2(f) \triangleq \sup_{\mathbf{X}_1 \sim \mathbf{X}_2} \|f(\mathbf{X}_1) - f(\mathbf{X}_2)\|_2$.

[Balle and Wang, 2018. “Improving the Gaussian Mechanism for Differential Privacy”]

Which noise to ensure privacy? (Common knowledge)

- Laplacian noise for pure ϵ -DP.



Noise level: $b^* = \frac{\Delta_1(f)}{\epsilon}$ with $\Delta_1(f) \triangleq \sup_{\mathbf{X}_1 \sim \mathbf{X}_2} \|f(\mathbf{X}_1) - f(\mathbf{X}_2)\|_1$.

[Dwork et al., 2006. "Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis"]

- Gaussian noise for approximate (ϵ, δ) -DP.

The noise scales with $\Delta_2(f) \triangleq \sup_{\mathbf{X}_1 \sim \mathbf{X}_2} \|f(\mathbf{X}_1) - f(\mathbf{X}_2)\|_2$.

[Balle and Wang, 2018. "Improving the Gaussian Mechanism for Differential Privacy"]

l_1/l_2 "sensitivities"

Privacy results

	Pure ϵ -DP	Approximate (ϵ, δ) -DP
	$\Delta_1(\Sigma)$	$\Delta_2(\Sigma)$
Fourier features	$\leq \sqrt{2m}$	$= \sqrt{m}$
+ Ω nonresonant	$= \sqrt{2m}$	$= \sqrt{m}$
Quadratic features	$= \ \Omega\ _2^2$	$= \ \Omega^T\ _{2 \rightarrow 4}^2$
+ Ω union of orthogonal bases.	$= m/d$	No particular closed form.

(Results for the “replacement” neighboring relation can be found in the manuscript.)

Privacy results

	Pure ϵ -DP	Approximate (ϵ, δ) -DP	
	$\Delta_1(\Sigma)$	$\Delta_2(\Sigma)$	
Fourier features	$\leq \sqrt{2m}$	$= \sqrt{m}$	Order-4 tensor approximation problem (NP-hard)
+ Ω nonresonant	$= \sqrt{2m}$	$= \sqrt{m}$	
Quadratic features	$= \ \Omega\ _2^2$	$= \ \Omega^T\ _{2 \rightarrow 4}^2$	
+ Ω union of orthogonal bases.	$= m/d$	No particular closed form.	


Holds almost surely!

(Results for the "replacement" neighboring relation can be found in the manuscript.)


Different problems:

- obtaining upper bounds (easy);
- obtaining sharp bounds (🧩);
- computing numerically the bound (🧩 in some settings).

Experimental results




Experimental results



Experimental results




Example for a **clustering task**:




Gowalla dataset, $d = 2$, $n \approx 10^6$ (real GPS data) – medians over 100 trials.

Experimental results



Example for a **clustering task**:



Gowalla dataset, $d = 2, n \approx 10^6$ (real GPS data) – medians over 100 trials.

Observations:

- Competitive results with other methods from the literature.
- DPLloyd suffers from its “iterative” nature.

Role of the noise-to-signal ratio

Noise-to-signal ratio:

$$\text{NSR} \triangleq \frac{\mathbf{E} \|\mathbf{z}(\mathbf{X}) - \tilde{\mathbf{s}}\|_2^2}{\|\tilde{\mathbf{s}}\|_2^2}.$$

private sketch

empirical sketch

Role of the noise-to-signal ratio


Noise-to-signal ratio:

$$\text{NSR} \triangleq \frac{\mathbf{E} \|\mathbf{z}(\mathbf{X}) - \tilde{\mathbf{s}}\|_2^2}{\|\tilde{\mathbf{s}}\|_2^2}.$$

private sketch

empirical sketch

Empirical correlation (clustering task):



Color = relative error.

Recall: m = sketch size
 $kd \approx$ number of parameters to learn

Role of the noise-to-signal ratio


Noise-to-signal ratio:

$$\text{NSR} \triangleq \frac{\mathbf{E} \|\mathbf{z}(\mathbf{X}) - \tilde{\mathbf{s}}\|_2^2}{\|\tilde{\mathbf{s}}\|_2^2}.$$

private sketch

empirical sketch

Empirical correlation (clustering task):



Color = relative error.

For m large enough and fixed, the NSR is **good indicator of the error**.


In the manuscript:

- analytical expression** of the NSR;
- estimation of useful **regimes**;
- hyperparameter **tuning**.

Recall: m = sketch size
 $kd \approx$ number of parameters to learn

Subsampling

💡 Compute only $r < m$ features of Φ when sketching.



Goal 1: Reduce the computational complexity.

Goal 2: Reduce the amount of released information.

Other approach in the literature: subsampling the **data records**.

[Balle et al., 2018. "Privacy Amplification by Subsampling"]

Record subsampling vs feature subsampling

Lemma (Cf. manuscript)

Both types of subsampling “**do not improve** privacy” when properly rescaling the sketch. In most settings, they also “**do not reduce** privacy” (i.e. previous bounds remain valid).

Note: In spite of that, subsampling improves the complexity-privacy tradeoff.

Record subsampling vs feature subsampling

Lemma (Cf. manuscript)


Both types of subsampling “**do not improve** privacy” when properly rescaling the sketch. In most settings, they also “**do not reduce** privacy” (i.e. previous bounds remain valid).

Note: In spite of that, subsampling improves the complexity-privacy tradeoff.

Legend:


- feature subsampling
- record subsampling

Observation: feature subsampling might in some regimes yield a better utility!



Efficient Sketching using Structured Matrices


About computational efficiency



Recall: $\Phi(\mathbf{x}) = \rho(\Omega^T \mathbf{x})$.

Ω is a $d \times m$ random matrix.

About computational efficiency




Recall: $\Phi(\mathbf{x}) = \rho(\Omega^T \mathbf{x})$.

Ω is a $d \times m$ random matrix.

→ $\mathcal{O}(nmd)$ computational complexity when Ω is dense.

About computational efficiency



Recall: $\Phi(\mathbf{x}) = \rho(\Omega^T \mathbf{x})$.

Ω is a $d \times m$ random matrix.

→ $\mathcal{O}(nmd)$ computational complexity when Ω is dense.

💡 Use a structured matrix Ω .

Goals:

- Reduce the sketching/learning complexity (and runtimes).
- Reduce the storage cost.


Building a square structured block

Standard examples of square structured matrices: Vandermonde, circulant,
Walsh-Hadamard...

Building a square structured block

Standard examples of square structured matrices: Vandermonde, circulant, **Walsh-Hadamard**...

Construction 1 (B_{R^3} block):




[Yu et al., 2016. "Orthogonal Random Features"]

Building a square structured block

Standard examples of square structured matrices: Vandermonde, circulant, **Walsh-Hadamard**...

Construction 1 (B_{R^3} block):



Construction 2 (B_{GR^2} block): use Gaussian values in the **third matrix**.
(The normalization term must also be adapted.)

The matrix Ω can be built by stacking such i.i.d. square blocks!

What do we gain?

In theory:

"Compressive k-means"

	CKM	Fast CKM	k-means
Time	$kd^2(n + k^2)$	$kd \ln(d)(n + k \ln(k))$	$ndkI$
Sketching	$nk\mathbf{d}^2$	$nk\mathbf{d} \ln(d)$	—
Learning (CL-OMP(R))	$k^3\mathbf{d}^2$	$k^3\mathbf{d} \ln(d)$	—
Space	$kd(d + n_b)$	kdn_b	nd
Ω	$k\mathbf{d}^2$	kd	—
$\Omega^T \mathbf{X}$ (by batch)	kdn_b	kdn_b	—


What do we gain?

In theory:

“Compressive k-means”


	CKM	Fast CKM	k-means
Time			
Sketching	$kd^2(n + k^2)$	$kd \ln(d)(n + k \ln(k))$	$ndkI$
Learning (CL-OMP(R))	nk^3d^2	$nk^3d \ln(d)$	—
Space			
Ω	$kd(d + n_b)$	kdn_b	nd
$\Omega^T X$ (by batch)	kd^2	kd	—
$\Omega^T X$ (by batch)	kdn_b	kdn_b	—

Speedup factors in practice:



Significant speed-ups, particularly for **small batches** (e.g. for learning).

Impact on learning quality



(The 4 curves are all superimposed on the left).

[Le et al., 2013. “Fastfood: Approximating Kernel Expansions in Loglinear Time”]

Observations:

- No degradation of the overall performance.
- The median error is even slightly reduced when using structured operators.

Some Theoretical Elements

A Key Ingredient for Theory: the Mean Kernel

Any distribution on Ω induces a mean **kernel** $\kappa(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \frac{1}{m} \mathbf{E}_{\Omega} \langle \Phi(\mathbf{x}), \Phi(\mathbf{y}) \rangle$.

“Similarity measure”

A Key Ingredient for Theory: the Mean Kernel

Any distribution on Ω induces a mean **kernel** $\kappa(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \frac{1}{m} \mathbf{E}_{\Omega} \langle \Phi(\mathbf{x}), \Phi(\mathbf{y}) \rangle$.

“Similarity measure”

Dense matrix Ω with i.i.d.
standard normal entries


known

Gaussian mean kernel
 $\kappa(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \exp\left(-\frac{\|\mathbf{x}-\mathbf{y}\|_2^2}{2\sigma_{\kappa}^2}\right)$

A Key Ingredient for Theory: the Mean Kernel

Any distribution on Ω induces a mean **kernel** $\kappa(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \frac{1}{m} \mathbf{E}_{\Omega} \langle \Phi(\mathbf{x}), \Phi(\mathbf{y}) \rangle$.


“Similarity measure”



A Key Ingredient for Theory: the Mean Kernel

Any distribution on Ω induces a mean **kernel** $\kappa(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \frac{1}{m} \mathbf{E}_{\Omega} \langle \Phi(\mathbf{x}), \Phi(\mathbf{y}) \rangle$.


“Similarity measure”



A Key Ingredient for Theory: the Mean Kernel

Any distribution on Ω induces a mean **kernel** $\kappa(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \frac{1}{m} \mathbf{E}_{\Omega} \langle \Phi(\mathbf{x}), \Phi(\mathbf{y}) \rangle$.

“Similarity measure”



Towards Theoretical Guarantees


Goal: establish a lower restricted isometry property (LRIP) of the form

$$\forall \tau, \tau' \in \mathfrak{G}, \|\tau - \tau'\|_{\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{H})} \lesssim \|\mathcal{A}(\tau) - \mathcal{A}(\tau')\|_2$$

Low-dimensional
model

Metric related to the
learning task

[Gribonval et al., 2020. *Compressive Statistical Learning with Random Feature Moments*]




Towards Theoretical Guarantees

Goal: establish a lower restricted isometry property (LRIP) of the form

$$\forall \tau, \tau' \in \mathfrak{G}, \|\tau - \tau'\|_{\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{H})} \lesssim \|\mathcal{A}(\tau) - \mathcal{A}(\tau')\|_2$$

↓ ↘
Low-dimensional model Metric related to the learning task

[Gribonval et al., 2020. *Compressive Statistical Learning with Random Feature Moments*]



Strategy:

- Establish a LRIP for the metric $\|\cdot\|_{\kappa}$ associated to the **mean** kernel κ :


$$\forall \tau, \tau' \in \mathfrak{G}, \|\tau - \tau'\|_{\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{H})} \lesssim \|\tau - \tau'\|_{\kappa}.$$

✓ for \mathbf{B}_{GR^2}
 (more technical for \mathbf{B}_{R^3})


- Study the **concentration** of $\|\mathcal{A}(\tau) - \mathcal{A}(\tau')\|_2$ w.r.t. $\|\tau - \tau'\|_{\kappa}$.
 - Establish a pointwise concentration result. ⚙️ **Work in progress...**
 - Use covering arguments to get a uniform result.

Summary and Perspectives

Summary of contributions



Summary of contributions




1. Privacy Preservation

- ✓ a noisy sketching mechanism;
- ✓ **sharp** DP guarantees (for Fourier and quadratic sketches);
- ✓ a new **subsampling** mechanism;
- ✓ an analysis of the NSR (+ application to parameters tuning).

Perspectives: Investigate other privacy definitions and attack models.

Summary of contributions



2. Reduction of the Complexity

- ☑ a **structured design** for the random sketching matrix;
- ☑ significant **empirical speedups** (for both sketching/learning);
- ☑ some preliminary guarantees.


Perspectives: control the concentration of the kernel; investigate further the orthogonal setting.

1. Privacy Preservation

- ☑ a noisy sketching mechanism;
- ☑ **sharp** DP guarantees (for Fourier and quadratic sketches);
- ☑ a new **subsampling** mechanism;
- ☑ an analysis of the NSR (+ application to parameters tuning).

Perspectives: Investigate other privacy definitions and attack models.



Summary of contributions



Perspectives

Directions for future work:

- Handling new learning tasks.
In particular, addressing supervised learning tasks.
(cf. Chapter 10 of the manuscript.)
- Working with intermediate features
... starting with kernel k-means and kernel PCA!
Akin to two-layers random neural networks.
- Sketching structured data.
E.g. graphs, images, etc.
- Obtaining guarantees on the heuristics used for the inverse problem.



List of publications

■ Privacy-preserving compressive learning

- Antoine Chatalic et al. "Compressive Learning with Privacy Guarantees". *Submitted to Information and Inference (under review)*, Mar. 3, 2020
- Vincent Schellekens et al. "Differentially Private Compressive K-Means". In: *2019 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP)*. May 2019, pp. 7933–7937
- Vincent Schellekens et al. "Compressive K-Means with Differential Privacy". In: *SPARS Workshop*. July 1, 2019

■ Efficient compressive learning

- Antoine Chatalic et al. "Large-Scale High-Dimensional Clustering with Fast Sketching". In: *IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP)*. 2018
- Antoine Chatalic and Rémi Gribonval. "Learning to Sketch for Compressive Clustering". In: *International Traveling Workshop on Interactions between Low-Complexity Data Models and Sensing Techniques (iTWIST)*. June 2020

■ Compressive clustering with message passing

- Evan Byrne et al. "Sketched Clustering via Hybrid Approximate Message Passing". In: *IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing* 67.17 (Sept. 2019), pp. 4556–4569

■ Overview articles

- Antoine Chatalic et al. "Projections aléatoires pour l'apprentissage compressif". In: *Gretsi*. Aug. 26, 2019
- Rémi Gribonval et al. "Sketching Datasets for Large-Scale Learning (Long Version)". Aug. 4, 2020 (under review)

... and coding ... and teaching.

Thank you!